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ABSTRACT: This paper presents a novel challenge to epistemic internalism. The challenge 
rests on a set of cases which feature subjects forming beliefs under conditions of ‘bad 
ideology’ – that is, conditions in which pervasively false beliefs have the function of 
sustaining, and are sustained by, systems of social oppression. In such cases, I suggest, the 
externalistic view that justification is in part a matter of worldly relations, rather than the 
internalistic view that justification is solely a matter of how things stand from the agent’s 
individual perspective, becomes the more intuitively attractive theory. But these ‘bad 
ideology’ cases do not merely yield intuitive verdicts that favour externalism over 
internalism. These cases are moreover analogous to precisely those canonical cases widely 
taken to be counterexamples to externalism: cases featuring brains-in-vats, clairvoyants, 
and dogmatists. That is, my ‘bad ideology’ cases are, in all relevant respects, just like cases 
that are thought to count against externalism – except that they intuitively favour 
externalism. This, I argue, is a serious worry for internalism, and bears interestingly on 
the debate over whether externalism is a genuinely ‘normative’ epistemology. 
 
 
 
 It is impossible by a mere individual…effort 
to escape from the web of the social lie 
TROTSKY1 
 
 
1. A new challenge for internalism 
 
Consider the following case: 
                                                   
1 As quoted and translated by Edmund Wilson (2003), p 438, from Trotsky’s Biography of 
Lenin, Volume 1 (1936). 
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RACIST DINNER TABLE: Nour, a young British woman of Arab descent, is 
invited to dinner at the home of a white friend from university. The host, 
Nour’s friend’s father, is polite and welcoming to Nour. He is generous 
with the food and wine, and asks Nour a series of questions about herself. 
Everyone laughs and talks amiably. As Nour comes away, however, she is 
unable to shake the conviction that her friend’s father is racist against 
Arabs. But replaying the evening in her head she finds it impossible to 
recover just what actions on the host’s part could be thought to be racist, 
or what would justify her belief in the host’s racism. If pressed, Nour would 
say she ‘just knows’ that her host is racist. In fact the host is racist – he 
thinks of Arabs as inherently fanatic, dangerous and backwards – and as a 
result did send off subtle cues that Nour subconsciously registered and 
processed. It is this subconscious sensitivity that led to her belief that her 
host is racist. 
 
Here is my question: is Nour’s belief that her host is racist (epistemically) justified? 
I think the intuitive answer is yes. Nour’s belief, after all, is the product of a 
sensitivity to racism, a sensitivity that allows her to dependably track whether or 
not the people she encounters are racist. It would seem odd to say that Nour ought 
not, epistemically speaking, have formed the belief that her host is racist, or that 
she did something epistemically impermissible in forming this belief. And it would 
seem similarly odd to say that, having formed the belief, Nour ought to now, 
epistemically speaking, give it up. Indeed, it seems right to say that if Nour were 
to give up her belief in her host’s racism, she would be losing an item of knowledge. 
If so, it follows that Nour’s belief must be justified.2  
 Of course, Nour has no awareness, introspective or otherwise, of how her 
subconscious racism-detection mechanism works – indeed, not even that it works. 
And she is unable to cite anything – any experience or bit of evidence – as grounds 
for her belief. (As she says, she ‘just knows’.) We might well want to say that Nour 
would be better off, epistemically speaking, if she had such a higher-order 
                                                   
2 I assume throughout that justification is a condition on knowledge. 
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awareness.3 Perhaps such an awareness would give Nour’s cognitive economy a 
greater degree of overall coherence,4 or a greater robustness against misleading 
counterevidence.5 And yet it seems counterintuitive to infer from the fact that 
Nour could be epistemically better off in these ways to the conclusion that her 
belief as it stands is unjustified. For Nour’s belief that her host is racist is not only 
true, but non-luckily so. Nour’s subconscious sensitivity to racism means that her 
belief gets on to the truth not as a mere matter of chance, not as a happy accident, 
but as a matter of predictable dependability. Surely then, her belief is justified. 
 
Now consider a second case: 
 
CLASSIST COLLEGE: Charles is a young man from a working-class 
background who has just become the newest fellow of an Oxford college. He 
is initially heartened by the Master’s explicit commitment to equality and 
diversity. The Master assures him that, though the college is still dominated 
by wealthy fellows, Charles will be welcomed and made to feel included. 
Indeed, the Master tells Charles, he too is from a working-class background, 
and has experienced plenty of discrimination in his time. Charles is confident 
not only that the college will be a good community for him, but also that the 
Master is a person of excellent judgment on these matters. However, a few 
incidents soon disrupt Charles’ rosy view of things. At high table, when 
Charles explains that he went to a state school, a fellow responds with ‘but 
you’re so well-spoken!’. At a visit to the pub, a number of young fellows sing 
the Eton boating song while Charles sits uncomfortably silent. Finally, 
                                                   
3 Just because Nour doesn’t know (ex hypothesi) how, or that, her racism-detection 
mechanism reliably works doesn’t necessarily mean that Nour can’t know that she knows 
that her host is racist. On a Stalnakerian view, knowledge iterates automatically, without 
the operation of inference. Many thanks to [omitted] for discussion of this issue. 
4 See Sosa 2009 on the virtues of ‘reflective’ over ‘animal’ knowledge. See also Goldman 
1988 on the distinction between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ justification. 
5 One might also think that Nour would need such higher-order awareness in order for the 
fact of her host’s racism to constitute what Grice (2001, ch 3) called a ‘personal’ reason for 
Nour to act – for example, by declining future supper invitations. (Thanks to [omitted] 
for this point.) My own view is that Nour’s knowing that her host is racist suffices to make 
this a practical reason for Nour. But nothing I say hangs on this. 
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Charles hears that the other fellows call him ‘Chavvy Charles’. Charles, who 
has a dependable sensitivity to classism, goes to the Master to report that 
he has experienced a number of classist incidents in college. Shocked, the 
Master asks him to explain what happened. But when Charles describes the 
incidents, the Master is visibly relieved. He assures Charles that none of 
these are genuinely classist incidents, but playful, innocuous interactions 
that are characteristic of the college’s communal culture. He tells Charles 
that he is sure that Charles himself will come to see things this way once he 
gets to know the college and its ways better. And finally, he gently suggests 
that Charles is being overly sensitive – something to which (the Master goes 
on) Charles is understandably prone to being, given his working-class 
background. Charles leaves the conversation unmoved, continuing to 
believe that he has faced classist discrimination in the college, and 
dismissing the Master’s testimony. Charles meanwhile is unaware that some 
people from working class backgrounds (e.g. the Master) suffer from false 
consciousness, distorting their ability to recognise class-based oppression. 
 
Is Charles’s ultimate belief that the college is classist justified?6 I think the 
intuitive answer is, again, yes. Like Nour, Charles forms a true belief on the basis 
of a dependable sensitivity to instances of classism. Unlike Nour, Charles 
maintains his true belief in the face of seemingly credible, misleading evidence – 
namely, the Master’s testimony to the effect that Charles’ belief is actually formed 
on an unreliable basis, viz. an oversensitivity to classist slights. And yet, this does 
not seem intuitively to affect the justification of Charles’ belief. Charles is not only 
justified in forming the initial belief that the college is classist; he intuitively 
remains justified even after the Master gives his misleading testimony to the 
contrary. Indeed, as with Nour, it seems right to say that Charles knows that the 
college is classist, both before and after the Master’s attempt to explain away 
Charles’ belief. 
                                                   
6 For the sake of simplicity, I am going to use the phrase ‘the college is classist’ as 
shorthand for the fact that Charles experienced a series of classist incidents in the college. 
Of course, just what it is for an institution to be classist, racist, sexist, etc., and just how 
this relates to the classism, racism, sexism, etc. of its constituent members, is a complicated 
issue. 
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 In dismissing the Master’s testimony, we might think that Charles 
exhibits a mild form of epistemic dogmatism, a dogmatism that could, if indulged 
in other circumstances, lead him to recklessly dismiss non-misleading evidence 
and court ignorance. (One way of cashing this out is to note that, if Charles had 
been in world in which his evaluation of the college was wrong, and the Master’s 
right, he would have stubbornly maintained a false belief.)7 We might also think 
that Charles would be better off, epistemically speaking, if he had available to him 
the phenomenon of false consciousness as a debunking explanation of the Master’s 
testimony: if he were in a position to explain away the Master’s testimony, rather 
than simply dismiss it. Perhaps we even think that Charles is somewhat 
blameworthy, epistemically speaking, for this act of dogmatism. And yet, none of 
this intuitively precludes Charles from justifiably believing – indeed, I think, 
knowing – that the college is classist. Charles’ belief that the college is classist, like 
Nour’s belief that her host is racist, is true not as a matter of good luck, of happy 
accident, but as a function of his capacity to dependably get on to the truth. This 
intuitively seems sufficient to justify it. 
 
Bear with me for a third, and final, case: 
 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: Radha is a woman who lives in rural India. Her 
husband, Krishnan, regularly beats her. After the beatings, Krishnan often 
expresses regret for having had to beat her, but explains that it was 
Radha’s fault for being insufficiently obedient or caring. Radha finds these 
beatings humiliating and guilt-inducing; she believes she has only herself 
to blame, and that she deserves to be beaten for her bad behaviour. After 
all, her parents, elders and friends agree that if she is being beaten it must 
be her fault, and no one she knows has ever offered a contrary opinion. 
Moreover, Radha has thoroughly reflected on the issue and concluded that, 
given the natural social roles of men and women, women deserve to be 
beaten by their husbands when they misbehave.8 
                                                   
7 One might object that there is in fact no metaphysically possible world in which – holding 
fixed the non-normative facts –  the college is not classist. For my purposes, however, what 
matters is that there conceivably is such a world, not that such a world in fact be 
metaphysically possible. For discussion, see §3.2. 
8 On contemporary attitudes towards domestic violence in India, see: 
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Is Radha’s belief that she deserves to be beaten justified? I think the answer is: 
surely not. For Radha’s belief is not merely false, but moreover the product of a 
convincing, and systematic, patriarchal illusion: that it is men’s place to 
subordinate women. This illusion – one that infects not only the testimony of 
Radha’s peers and respected elders, but her moral emotions (shame, remorse) and 
best attempts at rational reflection – ensures that Radha has no dependable access 
to the moral facts of her situation. Radha, despite her own best efforts, is tragically 
cut off from moral reality.  
 Radha’s false belief is hardly her fault; it is not only explained but 
obviously excused by the patriarchal illusion of which she is a victim. Radha is 
doing, we want to say, the best she can, given her own distorted epistemic 
connection to the world. Her belief is eminently understandable; we would be 
naïve to expect anything better of ourselves in Radha’s position. And yet none of 
this is the same as saying that Radha’s belief is justified. Indeed, once we draw the 
distinction between justification on one hand, and excusedness or blamelessness 
on the other,9 it feels intuitive, I think, to say that Radha’s belief meets the 
conditions for the latter, but not the former. Radha’s belief is the product of a 
distorted relationship to reality – a relationship that excuses the falsity of her 
beliefs, but does not thereby render them justified. 
 
These three cases – RACIST DINNER TABLE, CLASSIST COLLEGE and DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE – together present, I want to suggest, a serious challenge to a widely-
held view in epistemology. According to epistemic internalism, justification is a 
matter of a subject’s (non-factive) mental states: ‘internal’ duplicates, the 
internalist says, do not differ in justification. A typical internalist says that 
epistemic justification is a matter of fit with one’s evidence, or with one’s epistemic 
reasons, or more generally with how things look from one’s own perspective on 
the world – where it is presumed that such facts are facts about one’s (non-factive) 
                                                   
 https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/frind3/frind3-vol1andvol2.pdf, pp 475ff. 
9 The commonsensical distinction between justification and excuse is one to which Austin 
(1956) famously exhorted philosophers to attend. If I run over your dog while carefully 
backing out of my drive, I might be excused for killing him, but I certainly wouldn’t be 
justified for so doing. 
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mental states.10 Epistemic externalism, meanwhile, denies that epistemic 
justification supervenes solely on such ‘internal’ facts: ‘internal’ duplicates might 
well differ in justification. The externalist says that epistemic justification is at 
least partly a matter of facts that lie beyond one’s mental states – for example, 
whether one’s belief exhibits an appropriate causal connection to its content,11 or 
is a product of a reliable or safe method.12,13 
It is generally thought, by internalists and externalists alike, that intuitive 
reflection on a range of well-known cases – brains-in-vats, unwitting clairvoyants, 
dogmatists, and so on – supports internalism over externalism. But the three cases 
I described above – RACIST DINNER TABLE, CLASSIST COLLEGE and DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE – disrupt this tidy view of things. For externalism has a much easier 
time of vindicating what I take to be the intuitive verdicts on these cases than does 
internalism. In RACIST DINNER TABLE and CLASSIST COLLEGE, the subjects have 
a belief that is, ex hypothesi, reliably and safely connected to the truth. It is thus no 
mystery, from the externalist perspective, how such beliefs could be justified, since 
                                                   
10 One can have a view on which one’s epistemic reasons or one’s evidence is not a matter 
of one’s non-factive mental states, e.g. one can think, with Williamson, that one’s evidence 
is what one knows (Williamson 2000, ch 9). 
11 Goldman 1967. 
12 On reliability theories see Armstrong 1973 and Goldman 1975. On safety theories see 
Sosa 1996 and 2000, Williamson 2000 and Pritchard 2005. 
13 One might worry that the debate between internalism and externalism is merely verbal, 
since many externalists wish to maintain an internalistic notion within their epistemic 
taxonomies, e.g. Goldman has a notion of ‘weak’ justification (1988), Lasonen-Aarnio has 
the notion of ‘reasonableness’ (2010), and Wedgwood has ‘rationality’ (2002). However, 
such externalists insist that the notion of justification relevant to knowledge is externalistic, 
not internalistic, rendering their opposition to internalism substantive. A different way of 
dissolving the internalism/externalism debate is by adopting a pluralist metaepistemology, 
on which there are different sorts of epistemic justification, and (thus) different sorts of 
knowledge. (A pluralism about justification alone will not dissolve the 
internalist/externalist debate.) Elsewhere I argue that there are no non-trivial 
generalisations about the supervenience base of the relevant internalistic notion 
([omitted]). Many thanks to an anonymous referee and [omitted] for urging me to 
address these issues. 
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they straightforwardly satisfy the typical externalist conditions on justification.14 
In DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, meanwhile, the subject fails to exhibit such a connection 
between her belief and the truth, even while doing as best as she can by her own 
lights, believing in accordance with her evidence, and so forth. Thus it is again no 
mystery, from the externalist perspective, how her belief could fail to be justified. 
The internalist, meanwhile, has a more difficult time of it. Internalists 
divide into two kinds, depending on how they understand what it is to be an 
‘internal’ duplicate. According to access internalism, A and B are internal duplicates 
just in case they are identical with regard to their introspectively accessible mental 
states. According to mental state internalism, A and B are internal duplicates just 
in case they are identical with regard to their (non-factive) mental states, whether 
those states are accessible or not.15 For the sake of simplicity, I will focus on the 
challenge that my cases present to access internalism. (In §5, however, I will 
briefly show how my challenge extends to mental state internalism as well.) 
How could Nour or Charles be justified, according to the (access) 
internalist16, given that neither has any awareness of the reliable grounds of his or 
her belief – and indeed, in Charles’ case, has strong internalistic reason to think he 
is not so reliably grounded? And how could Radha be unjustified, according to the 
internalist, given that she believes in accordance with her (rather misleading) 
evidence, with what she has reason to believe, and with how things seem to her? 
The internalist appears to be faced with a choice between biting the bullet on these 
cases – conceding that they provide intuitive support for externalism – or trying 
to find a way to vindicate the ‘externalistic’ intuitions in a way consistent with 
internalism.  
 But the real challenge for internalism lies elsewhere. My three cases are 
not merely recalcitrant to internalistic treatment. They are moreover analogous 
                                                   
14 Externalistic treatment of cases like CLASSIST COLLEGE is complicated by the question 
of whether justification can be defeated by misleading evidence, a question on which 
externalists differ. I will discuss these complications shortly. Suffice it to say for now that 
at least some externalists would say that Charles’ belief retains its justification in the face 
of the Master’s testimony. 
15 On the distinction between access and mental state varieties of internalism, see Conee 
and Feldman (2001). 
16 From now on, when I refer to ‘internalists’ and ‘internalism’ I mean access internalists 
and access internalism, unless stated otherwise. 
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to those very cases that internalists have canonically presented as 
counterexamples to externalism. Consider, for example, one of Laurence BonJour’s 
famous such counterexamples: 
 
CLAIRVOYANT:  Norman, under certain conditions that usually obtain, is a 
completely reliable clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject 
matter. He possesses no evidence or reasons of any kind for or against the 
general possibility of such a cognitive power, or for or against the thesis 
that he possesses it. One day Norman comes to believe that the President is 
in New York City, though he has no evidence either for or against this belief. 
In fact the belief is true and results from his clairvoyant power, under 
circumstances in which it is completely reliable17 
 
Because Norman’s belief is based on a reliable method, the typical externalist will 
say that it is justified.18 But many find this externalist verdict absurd. BonJour 
writes that Norman’s belief is ‘epistemically irrational and irresponsible, and 
thereby unjustified’.19 For it is part of one’s epistemic duty, he goes on, to ‘reflect 
critically upon one’s beliefs, and such critical reflection precludes believing things 
to which one has, to one’s knowledge, no reliable means of epistemic access’.20 
Norman’s belief, BonJour says, is from Norman’s own perspective nothing more 
than an ‘unfounded hunch’ (ibid). Thus Norman’s belief, pace the externalist, is 
unjustified. 
 It is worth noting that not all internalists will agree with BonJour’s 
account of why Norman is unjustified. For BonJour is invoking a very strong 
internalist condition on justification, according to which S’s belief that p is justified 
iff S has (independent and undefeated) reason to believe that her belief was formed 
on a reliable basis. For BonJour, agents need to be not only aware of their grounds, 
but also aware that their grounds are their grounds. Most internalists will reject 
this strong demand, insisting, more minimally, that agents must be aware of their 
                                                   
17 BonJour 1980, 62. 
18 BonJour intends CLAIRVOYANT as a counterexample to reliabilist versions of 
externalism, but it can be thought of as a potential counterexample, mutatis mutandis, to 
other varieties of externalism as well. 
19 Ibid 63. 
20 Ibid. 
 10 
grounds in order to have a justified belief. The problem with Norman for this more 
common type of internalist is that there appears to be nothing of which Norman 
is aware that could serve as the grounds for his belief. While BonJour doesn’t 
explicitly say so, we can stipulate that Norman’s clairvoyance is accompanied by 
no experiences or phenomenology; rather than clairvoyance being a sort of quasi-
perceptual seeming, it is simply a subconscious power that produces reliably true 
beliefs that ‘pop’ into Norman’s head. Norman’s belief can’t be justified, on the 
typical internalist view, because Norman is bereft of any mental state to serve as 
its grounds. 
 And yet, CLAIRVOYANT is analogous to RACIST DINNER TABLE, in which, 
recall, Nour’s belief is intuitively justified. Both Norman and Nour exhibit a 
sensitivity to the truth, a sensitivity of which they are unaware but that 
nonetheless produces reliably true beliefs. From her internal perspective, Nour’s 
belief is no better, BonJour would presumably say, than a ‘hunch’, and must be 
therefore unjustified. And, like Norman, Nour has nothing that is introspectively 
available to her – no experiences or phenomenology – that could potentially serve 
as the grounds for her belief, since it is only her subconscious that detects the 
subtle cues of her host’s behaviour.  And yet Nour’s belief that her host is racist 
seems eminently justified. 
 But how could it be that Norman’s belief is any less justified than Nour’s? 
Indeed it cannot be so. Insofar as these cases are analogous in the relevant respects, 
Nour and Norman’s justification must stand or fall together. 21 It is not enough, 
then, for the internalist simply to bite the bullet on RACIST DINNER TABLE, 
concluding that it intuitively supports externalism while cleaving nonetheless to 
internalism. If the internalist wants to continue to use CLAIRVOYANT as evidence 
against externalism and in favour of internalism, she needs to say something about 
RACIST DINNER TABLE. Either the internalist needs to tell us why RACIST 
DINNER TABLE is in fact relevantly disanalogous to CLAIRVOYANT, or she needs 
                                                   
21 While I myself am inclined to endorse the claim that Nour is justified iff Norman is 
justified, all that matters is there are no relevant disanalogies between the two cases to 
which the internalist can point. An externalist might well think that Nour is justified while 
Norman is not, for reasons unavailable to the internalist: for example, because Nour’s 
belief-forming method is naturalistically explicable, while Norman’s is not. For the sake of 
ease I will assume an externalism on which the two cases are relevantly analogous, but 
nothing in my argument hangs on this. Many thanks to an anonymous editor for this point. 
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to offer us an error theory as to why the intuitions elicited by RACIST DINNER 
TABLE are not to be trusted. Of course, the externalist who wants to use RACIST 
DINNER TABLE as part of her case against internalism faces a symmetric challenge: 
that is, she is under pressure to explain why RACIST DINNER TABLE, but not 
CLAIRVOYANT, elicits unreliable, internalistic intuitions about justification. And 
indeed, I will offer such an error theory on behalf of the externalist in the course 
of this paper. 
For now let me return to CLASSIST COLLEGE and DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
which, I want to argue, are also analogous to cases traditionally thought to favour 
internalism over externalism. Recall that in CLASSIST COLLEGE, I claimed, 
Charles has an intuitively justified (and indeed intuitively knowledgeable) belief 
that his Oxford college is classist, despite the misleading testimony of the Master. 
Charles’ belief is intuitively justified, I suggested, because it is based on Charles’ 
dependable sensitivity to instances of classism. But CLASSIST COLLEGE is 
analogous to a kind of case that is canonically thought to elicit the opposite 
intuition, and thereby impugn externalism. Compare:22 
 
DOGMATIST: At a time t1 Mary walks into an art gallery and sees a red 
sculpture. There is nothing abnormal about Mary’s perceptual faculties or 
the lighting conditions in the gallery. Thus she forms a true belief that the 
sculpture is red. At a slightly later time t2 a gallery assistant tells Mary that 
the sculpture is not red, but illuminated by a hidden red light, such that any 
object it shines on would look red even if it weren’t. Mary ignores the 
misleading testimony and continues to believe, on the basis of her reliable 
perceptual faculties, that the sculpture is red. What Mary does not know is 
that the exhibition – including the gallery assistant’s misleading testimony 
– is being put on by a famous artists’ collective dedicated to epistemic 
hoaxes. 
 
                                                   
22 There are many versions of this case, but mine follows most closely Lasonen-Aarnio’s 
‘Trick on Suzy’ (2010, 1). See also Chisholm 1966: 48, Bonjour 1980: 59–60, Pollock 1995: 
41 and Pollock and Cruz 1999: 44. Lasonen-Aarnio, unlike the other authors, embraces the 
(pure) externalist verdict that her protagonist continues to know in the face of the 
misleading testimony – a case of what she calls ‘unreasonable knowledge’. 
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The standard intuitive verdict on DOGMATIST is that Mary’s belief, while initially 
justified at t1, loses justification at t2, when the misleading testimony is delivered. 
After all, how could Mary’s belief that the sculpture is red be justified after she is 
told by a seemingly reliable expert that her perceptual capacities are unreliable? 
In continuing to believe that the sculpture is red, doesn’t Mary ignore evidence 
that, from her perspective, bears squarely and damningly on her belief? Isn’t her 
belief, even if true, both irresponsible and blameworthy? And if so, how could it be 
justified? 
 Indeed, the intuition that Mary (and other similar dogmatists) are 
unjustified is generally thought so compelling that most externalists feel pressure 
to modify their externalism in order to vindicate it. What we might call a pure 
externalism says that the satisfaction of the externalist condition (e.g. reliability, 
safety) is both necessary and sufficient for justification. According to pure 
externalism, Mary’s belief at t2 – because it is still based on her reliable (safe, etc.) 
perceptual faculties – retains its justification.23 Cases like DOGMATIST prompt 
most externalists to reject pure externalism, instead favouring a modified, 
internalistically-inspired theory according to which S’s belief is justified just in 
case S’s belief satisfies the externalist justification-condition and S is not in 
possession of strong misleading evidence to the contrary.24 This modification 
allows the moderate externalist to vindicate the intuition that Mary’s belief is 
justified at t1 but loses its justification at t2. Meanwhile, only a small minority of 
externalists are willing to bite the bullet on DOGMATIST-type cases in order to 
                                                   
23 A pure externalist could argue that Mary loses justification at t2 (and mutatis mutandis 
for other DOGMATIST-type cases) because the method on which Mary’s belief at t2 is based 
(which involves dismissing misleading evidence) is in fact unreliable or unsafe. Thus 
DOGMATIST turns out to be a case of Mary switching from a justification-conferring 
method to a justification-depriving method. I set aside this possibility in what follows, 
assuming that Mary’s belief-forming method is stable from t1 to t2. 
24 For some examples of moderate externalists, see Alston 1988, Bergmann 2006, Goldman 
1986: 62-3 and 111-2, and Nozick 1981, 196. Some externalists (e.g. Bergmann and 
Goldman) endorse defeat conditions that are even more liberal than those of the moderate 
externalism I describe, allowing that even unjustified higher-order beliefs (e.g. beliefs 
generated by baseless paranoia) are sufficient to destroy justification. 
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maintain pure externalism.25 DOGMATIST-type cases are widely thought to show 
that pure externalism must be false.  
 And yet, DOGMATIST is analogous to CLASSIST COLLEGE, in which 
Charles’ belief, recall, intuitively retains its justification, despite the misleading 
evidence, just as the pure externalist predicts. How could Charles and Mary differ 
in justification? Both Charles and Mary use their properly functioning capacities 
– to detect classism, to detect colour – to arrive at their respectively true beliefs. 
They are then both met with testimony, from sources they have strong antecedent 
reason to believe to be trustworthy, to the effect that their belief-forming capacities 
are in fact unreliable. They both dismiss this misleading evidence, despite the fact 
that neither has available to her the proper explanation of why the evidence is 
misleading – that the Master is suffering from false consciousness, that the ‘gallery 
assistant’ is part of the art piece – maintaining their original beliefs. So it seems 
that Mary’s belief cannot be any less justified than Charles’. Either both beliefs are 
justified, or neither is. The internalist who wishes to use DOGMATIST as a 
counterexample to (pure) externalism will have to explain why it is that an 
analogous case appears to be a counterexample not to externalism, but internalism. 
 Third and finally, recall that in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, Radha has an 
intuitively unjustified belief that she deserves to be beaten, a belief that is a 
symptom of a systematically distorted relationship to reality. Now consider the 
following case: 
 
BRAIN-IN-A-VAT: JaneBIV is a handless brain-in-a-vat, subjected to a 
compelling, electrochemical illusion to the effect that she is a normally 
embodied person 
 
The external world sceptic asks how it is that Jane, a normally embodied person, 
can know that she has hands given that, for all Jane knows, she could be JaneBIV. 
The externalist answers that because Jane is, ex hypothesi, a normally embodied 
person – i.e. because Jane is in fact not JaneBIV – Jane’s belief that she has hands 
enjoys a (reliable, safe, etc.) connection with the external world which in turn 
secures justification. While Jane and JaneBIV are internal duplicates, the externalist 
insists, their beliefs enjoy different justificatory standing. In turn this explains, the 
                                                   
25 e.g. Plantinga 1986, Lasonen-Aarnio 2010, Williamson 2014. 
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externalist goes on, how it is that Jane can know she has hands despite the fact 
that JaneBIV’s situation is subjectively indiscriminable from Jane’s.26 
 But this capacity to brush off sceptical threats comes at a price, one that 
strikes most internalists as extortionate. For typical externalist theories imply 
that JaneBIV’s belief that she has hands is unjustified: for JaneBIV’s belief, unlike 
Jane’s belief, lacks the appropriate externalist connection to the world. But how 
could it be, the internalist asks, that Jane and JaneBIV differ in justification, when 
(it is granted by all parties) things appear just the same for both Jane and JaneBIV; 
when JaneBIV is entirely blameless for her belief; when JaneBIV seems to be acting 
no less responsibly, epistemically speaking, than Jane; and when it is just a matter 
of bad luck that JaneBIV is envatted rather than embodied? Stewart Cohen famously 
called this the ‘new evil demon problem’ for externalism.27 ‘It strikes me as clearly 
false’ Cohen writes, ‘to deny that [the brain-in-a-vat’s] beliefs could be justified. 
If we have every reason to believe e.g., perception is a reliable process, the mere 
fact that unbeknown to us it is not reliable should not affect [our] justification’ 
(ibid, 281-2). Cohen explains that this judgment ‘hinges’ on his ‘viewing 
justification as a normative notion’ (ibid 282). So long as one’s belief is ‘appropriate 
to the available evidence’, he says, one cannot be ‘held responsible for 
circumstances beyond [one’s] ken’ (ibid). Justification, in other words, cannot be 
a matter of facts unavailable to one: the externalist’s verdict on BRAIN-IN-A-VAT 
must be false. 
 And yet, BRAIN-IN-A-VAT is analogous to DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, where 
the intuitive verdict was, I suggested, that Radha’s belief is not justified. Radha and 
JaneBIV are both victims of systematic illusions; JaneBIV is literally envatted, while 
Radha is, as it were, envatted in patriarchal ideology. Both of their beliefs are 
internalistically impeccable: both JaneBIV and Radha believe in accordance with 
how things seem to them, do not neglect any evidence, and do as well 
(epistemically speaking) as we would in their shoes (or vat). Why then should 
Radha’s belief that she deserves to be beaten be any less justified than JaneBIV’s 
belief that she has hands? The internalist who wants to use BRAIN-IN-A-VAT as 
                                                   
26 Is Jane’s situation also subjectively indiscriminable from JaneBIV’s situation? The typical 
externalist will think not. Jane is able to know that she has hands, and from this (the 
externalist thinks) she can knowledgeably infer that she is not JaneBIV. Thus the externalist 
will object to the sceptic’s initial claim that Jane, ‘for all she knows’, could be JaneBIV. 
27 Cohen 1984. 
 15 
part of her argument against externalism – who wants, that is, to insist that the 
‘new evil demon problem’ really is a problem – needs to explain just why it is that 
our intuitions about DOMESTIC VIOLENCE appear to favour externalism over 
internalism. 
 
Together, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, RACIST DINNER TABLE and CLASSIST COLLEGE 
present a serious challenge for internalism. As I have said, these cases are more 
straightforwardly and intuitively handled by externalism than by internalism. 
More pressingly, these new cases are analogous to precisely those familiar cases 
that are generally thought to be counterexamples to externalism. The internalist 
who wants to continue to treat the traditional cases as evidence against 
externalism is thus under pressure to say something about my new cases. Here she 
has two options: to show that my new cases are in fact relevantly disanalogous to 
the traditional cases, or to show how the externalistic intuitions the new cases 
elicit can be explained away by a compelling error theory. 
 Having set out this new challenge to internalism, the remainder of this 
paper proceeds as follows. In §2 I offer a diagnosis as to why our intuitive verdicts 
diverge between these two sets of cases, old and new. In the new cases, subjects 
are operating under what we might call conditions of bad ideology: that is, 
conditions in which pervasively false beliefs have the function of sustaining, and 
are in turn sustained by, systems of social oppression. When we consider subjects 
operating under such conditions, I want to suggest, the externalist verdict that 
justification is a matter of an agent’s relationship to the world becomes much more 
intuitively appealing than the internalist verdict that justification is a matter of 
how things stand from the agent’s individual perspective. Externalism, but not 
internalism, allows us to treat justification as a structural matter: that is, a matter 
of the larger systems in which agents are embedded. 
 I then go on to canvass strategies for an internalist response to my 
challenge. In §3 I raise, and respond to, the objection that my new cases are 
importantly disanalogous to the old cases. In §4 I discuss the internalist’s 
prospects for an error theory: that my ‘bad ideology’ cases are too 
morally/politically charged to generate reliable intuitions. In §5 I briefly show 
how my challenge applies to mental state internalism, and thus to internalism 
generally. In §6 I conclude with a discussion of how my challenge bears on the 
debate over externalism’s status as a genuinely ‘normative’ epistemology. 
 16 
 
2. A diagnosis: justification and bad ideology 
 
What explains the divergence in our intuitions across the two sets of cases I 
discussed in §1? The new cases are what we might call ‘bad ideology’ cases – that 
is, cases that feature subjects who exist in conditions in which pervasively false 
beliefs have the function of sustaining (and are in turn sustained by) systems of 
social oppression: patriarchy, racism, classism. In such cases, I want to suggest, the 
salient epistemological question becomes not whether subjects are blameworthy or 
praiseworthy for their beliefs – whether their beliefs are reasonable by the subjects’ 
own lights – but how these beliefs relate to a system whose function it is to distort 
subjects’ access to the truth for the purposes of oppressing them. What intuitively 
matters most in such cases is whether the subject’s truth-tracking capacities are 
distorted by ideological forces, or whether the subject is endowed with capacities 
that allow her to pierce through ideological distortion. 
 Thus in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, what seems to intuitively matter most, 
epistemically speaking, is not that Radha’s belief is perfectly reasonable by her own 
lights – a thought the externalist is happy to capture by saying her belief is excused28 
– but that her belief is the product of an ideologically-distorted mechanism. This, 
                                                   
28 On the externalist notion of excuse, see Williamson 2007. 
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we instinctively feel, is what matters for justification.29,30 Meanwhile, in the case of 
Nour and Charles, we have subjects who are able to reliably get on to the truth, 
                                                   
29 What should we say about true ideological beliefs, of the kind that arise because of self-
fulfilling processes (see Haslanger 2007)? For example, what shall we say about a case in 
which a man’s belief that his wife is submissive is reliably true, but as a result of his treating 
her with the expectation that she will be submissive? (This sort of belief is usually 
accompanied by a further false belief that women are submissive by nature. But here I am 
concerned with the straightforwardly true belief.) A standard externalism might count 
such a belief as justified, since (with regard to self-fulfilling ideological beliefs) believing in 
accordance with patriarchal ideology is a reliable, truth-tracking, safe, etc. method. I am 
inclined to accept this verdict, and indeed to say that part of what is troubling about self-
fulfilling ideology cases is precisely that oppression can give rise to not only true but 
moreover justified beliefs. If this is right, then it seems that externalism can only explain 
the deficiencies of false ideological beliefs, not true ones. Of course, an externalist need not 
say this: she might argue instead that believing in accordance with patriarchal ideology is 
in fact an unreliable, unsafe, etc. method – a method that yields nearby false verdicts in 
cases of non-self-fulfilling beliefs. (That it is an open question whether ideological 
mechanisms are reliable, safe. etc. in such cases is an instance of the well-known generality 
problem for externalism.)  Thanks to [omitted] for calling my attention to this issue, and 
to an anonymous referee for further drawing me out. 
30 An anonymous referee presses the following challenge. Imagine a case, DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE*, in which Radha* exists in a non-patriarchal society, but because of a quirk of 
her neurophysiology, believes she deserves to be beaten by her husband. Is Radha* any 
more intuitively justified than Radha? If not, then it would seem that the right explanation 
for why we are inclined to judge Radha unjustified in the original case has nothing to do 
with the presence of bad ideology. I am not convinced by this objection. First, cases of 
neurophysiological dysfunction are not obviously cases that meet the standards for 
internalistic justification: some internalists will simply want to say that only agents with 
minimally competent cognition are candidates for justified belief. If so, then these two cases 
are not analogous tests of internalistic intuition. Second, it’s not clear that we can entertain 
a case featuring a woman believing she deserves to be beaten by her husband without 
tacitly invoking bad ideology. Consider a case that features a false belief about dessert that 
is (in our world) clearly non-ideological. Suppose Radha** falsely believes that she 
deserves the last slice of cake because all her evidence suggests that this is right. After all, 
all her friends and family says she does, as do her gut instincts and her careful deliberations. 
Is her false belief justified? I suspect that internalists will be much more inclined to say yes 
than in the original DOMESTIC VIOLENCE case. 
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despite their bad ideological circumstances, thanks to a socially-endowed capacity 
to pierce through ideological illusion. For Nour and Charles, because of their 
respective social positions – as an Arab, and as a member of the working class – 
share an ability to reliably apply concepts (racist, classist) in ways that contest the 
dominant ideology.31 
 Externalistic verdicts in bad ideology cases are attractive, I want to suggest, 
because what intuitively matters in such cases is not how things seem from the 
agent’s own (often limited) perspective, but how the agent relates to the 
epistemically distorting systems in which they are embedded. 32 Justification, for 
the internalist, is a sort of meritocratic good: it is available to all minimally 
competent agents, regardless of their circumstances, distorted or veridical. All that 
is required to be internalistically justified is individual conscientiousness. (Thus 
Radha must be justified.) Moreover, internalistic justification is not something that 
one can possess through the good luck of veridical circumstances: agents who are 
‘internally’ equal will also be equal in justification. (Thus Nour and Charles must 
be unjustified.) For the externalist, meanwhile, justification can come apart from 
questions of personal responsibility and blamelessness. To be externalistically 
justified requires, in part, the cooperation of the external world: one must have an 
undistorted relationship to the relevant bit of reality, which is not something 
entirely within one’s control. Thus Radha is unjustified, despite her individual 
conscientiousness and blamelessness, because of her ideologically-distorted 
connection to reality. What is more, the externalist maintains that one can, as it 
were, ‘stumble into’ justification, by being felicitously connected to the relevant bit 
of reality. Thus Nour and Charles are justified, despite the fact that they each have 
an internal duplicate who falsely believes that, respectively, their host is racist and 
                                                   
31 Radha is a member of an oppressed social group – women – who is not so similarly 
endowed. Mere membership in an oppressed class does not suffice for the ability to see 
through bad ideology. A discussion of this point, and its connection with standpoint 
epistemology, follows shortly. 
32 To be clear, I am not arguing that epistemic justification is in any way context-dependent, 
shifting with whether a subject exists under conditions of bad ideology or not. I am instead 
merely offering an explanation as to why it is that, for many, the externalistic verdict 
becomes more intuitively attractive when we shift from the old (non-ideological) to the 
new (ideological) cases. 
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their college is classist.33 This is because (so says the externalist) Nour and Charles 
have the good luck – thanks to their social positions – of being properly connected 
to the world in a way that is conducive to knowledge. In all three cases, whether 
the subjects are justified or not turns, in part, on factors that are not within their 
individual control.  
 In short, externalism – in its insistence that justification can supervene on 
facts external to the agent’s own ken – is poised to vindicate what we might think 
of as a structural rather than merely individualistic notion of justification. A 
structural explanation gives an account of its explanandum by averting to the 
larger system of which the explanandum is a part, rather than (solely) adverting to 
features of the explanandum itself. To explain that the dutiful housewife does the 
lion’s share of the domestic labour because she prefers it that way is to give an 
individualistic explanation of her behaviour; to explain that the dutiful housewife 
does the lion’s share of the domestic labour because that is what is socially expected 
of women is to give a structural explanation. Both explanations might well be true 
– social expectations can produce adaptive preferences – but in certain contexts it 
is clearly the latter sort of explanation that is important. Similarly, to employ a 
structuralist account of justification is to explain a subject’s justificatory status in 
terms of the broader epistemic system in which she is embedded. Radha’s belief is 
unjustified because she is the victim of bad ideology. Nour and Charles’ beliefs are 
justified because their group membership allows them to pierce through bad ideology. 
Meanwhile, the internalist – in her insistence that justification supervenes on a 
subject’s mental states – is not poised to underwrite a structural notion of 
justification. Instead, she can only explain an agent’s justificatory status in terms 
that are intrinsic to the agent herself. Externalism, but not internalism, is poised 
to vindicate Trotsky’s claim that ‘escape from the web of the social lie’ is more than 
a matter of ‘mere individual effort’. 
 As the reference to Trotsky suggests, my way of thinking about what might 
be deeply at stake between internalism and externalism – that is, the ability to 
                                                   
33 One might object that Charles does not in fact have an internal duplicate who falsely 
believes that the college is classist, since any possible college in which such events took 
place would be classist (cf. fn 7). Similarly, one could object that Radha does not have an 
internal duplicate who truly believes that she deserves to be beaten – and that this in turn 
shows that Radha’s belief is not even internalistically justified. I take up this line of 
objection in §3.3. 
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vindicate a structural epistemology – has resonances with Marxist standpoint 
epistemology. For Marx, the proletariat’s relationship to the means of production 
confers on it, as a class, an epistemic privilege vis-à-vis society’s economic relations. 
While the ‘Free-trader Vulgaris’ sees the marketplace as ‘a very Eden of the innate 
rights of man’ where ‘alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham’, those 
who are forced to sell their labour are positioned to see the material reality under 
the ideological appearance: to see that the marketplace is a site of exploitation, 
where they have ‘nothing to expect but…a hiding’ (Marx 1867/1887, 123).34 
Likewise, for feminist standpoint epistemologists, it is women’s relationship to the 
means of reproduction – women’s role in childrearing, nurturing, and caregiving – 
that confers on them, as a class, an epistemic advantage in understanding the real 
material relations of society under the ideological (patriarchal) appearance.35 As 
both Lukács and Hartsock stress, the proletarian and feminist standpoints, 
respectively, are to be achieved, and are not something automatically given in virtue 
of one’s status as an oppressed subject under capitalism or patriarchy. Piercing the 
ideological appearance requires an overcoming of false consciousness and the 
achievement of revolutionary consciousness, in turn a matter of both political 
analysis and political action. But neither revolutionary analysis nor revolutionary 
action is easily achieved by the individual alone: thus the emphasis on collective 
consciousness raising in both Marxist and (especially) feminist politics. This is the 
second sense, for standpoint epistemologists, in which the overcoming of the ‘social 
lie’, as Trotsky says, is not a merely individual achievement. First, where one finds 
oneself in the social ordering (one’s place, say, in relation to the means or 
production or reproduction) confers on one epistemic advantages or disadvantages, 
putting one in a better or worse place to recognise the truth under the lie. Second, 
even if one is, epistemically speaking, advantageously positioned, one’s likelihood 
of achieving the privileged standpoint turns on one’s relationship to others – 
specifically, whether one enjoys the sort of political community that can together 
create a rival to the dominant ideology. 
                                                   
34 The classic elaboration of Marxist standpoint theory is Georg Lukács’ (1923/1971). 
35 The locus classicus of feminist standpoint epistemology is Hartsock 1983. See also 
Harding 1983 and 2004, Jameson 1988a, Collins 2000, and Wylie 2003. Note that the 
particular understanding of the feminist standpoint as grounded in women’s relationship 
to the means of reproduction, due to Hartsock, is not shared by all proponents of feminist 
standpoint theory. 
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 There is a natural kinship, I want to suggest, between Marxist standpoint 
epistemology and externalism. Both stress the way in which the distribution of 
epistemic goods turns, in part, on factors beyond subjective control, producing a 
deep epistemic asymmetry between agents in internally analogous positions. Thus 
the proletarian, like Charles, is able to know something of the truth about his 
society, despite the fact that he is surrounded by the misleading counter-testimony 
of those who see the world as the reigning ideology dictates – and despite, 
moreover, the fact that such dogmatism, in someone not so reliably situated vis-à-
vis the reigning ideology, would lead to error. And, like Nour, the proletarian is 
able to know even without knowing the grounds of her belief – even though such 
credulity would, again, lead to error in someone not so reliably situated. Meanwhile 
Radha, like some members of the proletariat, is a classic victim of bad ideology, 
believing that the world is just as it presents itself as being. Hartsock writes that 
the capitalist’s vision of the world ‘cannot be dismissed either as simply false or as 
an epistemology relevant to only a few’. For, she goes on, ‘the worker as well as the 
capitalist engages in the purchase and sale of commodities…and [as] material life 
structures consciousness, this cannot fail to have an effect’ (Hartsock 1983, 288). 
This is not to say that Radha – or anyone else suffering from false consciousness – 
could never come to know the truth of her situation. But it is to say that, for many 
victims of false consciousness, coming to know the truth would require something 
more than more assiduous reflection. Most obviously, it would require that she 
have her consciousness raised through political engagement.36 
                                                   
36 What is the externalist to say about the false ideological beliefs of those who benefit from 
the dominant ideology? What should we say, for example about the Wall Street trader 
who believes he deserves his wealth because he works so hard? Naturally, the externalist 
will say that this belief is not justified (again, I think this is the intuitively correct verdict), 
since it is based on a faulty mechanism – viz. the ideology of meritocracy. But is the trader 
excused for believing he deserves his wealth? What about the false ideological beliefs of 
those who are also (but differentially) oppressed, e.g. the out-of-work coal miner who 
blames his joblessness on immigrants? My own intuition is to say that the out-of-work 
coal miner’s false belief is more excused than that of the Wall Street trader, but that 
perhaps even the latter has some degree of excuse. The details matter: what evidence do 
the trader and coal miner have? Are they really like Radha, who is fully immersed in a self-
confirming ideological scenario? (I do not think that all victims of oppression are like 
Radha; many might well be blameworthy for their false ideological beliefs, because they fail 
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 What about Charles and Nour? Are they not able to achieve the relevant 
standpoints all by themselves?37 To think so is to make two mistakes. First, insofar 
as Nour and Charles are able to reliably apply the concepts racist and classist, 
respectively, it is because they have learned those concepts (directly or indirectly) 
from counter-hegemonic political communities. What is more, their reliable 
sensitivity to racism and classism, respectively, is also due to their particular social 
positions – as an Arab woman and a working class man, respectively – which in 
turn are given, not chosen. Second, neither Charles nor Nour has achieved 
something like a full proletarian standpoint. To carry on with Trotsky’s image, 
they have begun to disentangle themselves from the web of the social lie, but they 
are still largely its captives. Charles does not yet have full revolutionary class 
consciousness, and nor does Nour have full race consciousness. Indeed, one can 
easily imagine Charles and Nour losing the epistemic gains they have made, their 
initial confidence shaken by further misleading testimony or ideological re-
entrenchment. What they need is more help from the outside: others with whom, 
together, they can articulate a coherent and stable worldview that can withstand 
the onslaught of the dominant ideology. 
 One feature of the externalist treatment of Charles and Nour is that it can 
achieve a balance between two rival, attractive thoughts. On one hand, we have 
Marx’s recognition that the position of the oppressed can afford a dispensation from 
some of the epistemic ills of the oppressors. And on the other, we have the thought 
– on which much emphasis has been put in recent years by analytic philosophers38 
-- that oppression can deprive subjects of epistemic goods like justification and 
knowledge. A balance between these two thoughts might be achieved by 
recognising the ways in which the knowledge afforded by oppressed social 
positions might yet fail to be ideal forms of knowledge: by recognising, for example, 
that Nour would be better off if she were aware of her own reliable sensitivity to 
racism, or that Charles would be better off if he were able to explain away the 
                                                   
to believe in accordance with their evidence.) In any case, I am not trying to offer a general 
theory of when one’s false belief is excused by ideological circumstances; rather, my point 
is simply that externalists are able to make sense of beliefs that fall short of justification 
but are nonetheless blameless. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me to address 
this point. 
37 With thanks to an anonymous editor for discussion of this point. 
38 e.g. Fricker 2007, Stanley 2015. Cf. Medina 2013. 
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Master’s misleading testimony as a product of false consciousness, and that both 
would be better off still if they had worked out worldviews to rival the dominant 
ideology. The externalist verdict that Nour and Charles nonetheless know 
something of their social reality allows us to ward off scepticism about the social 
world while still duly noting the epistemic costs of oppression.39 This, I want to 
suggest, is part of why the externalist verdict is attractive in these cases: just as 
externalism allows us to know empirical truths about the external world despite 
the spectre of our envatted brain doppelgängers, externalism allows us to know 
about the social world despite the spectre of bad ideology. 
 
I have here suggested a diagnosis as to why the externalist verdicts are more 
intuitive in my new cases than they are in the analogous, more familiar cases. My 
diagnosis – that in cases featuring bad ideology we are more prone to think in 
structural rather than individualistic terms, and thus more pulled towards 
externalistic rather than internalistic notions of justification – is, to repeat, merely 
psychological. It does not, by itself, constitute an argument in favour of externalism 
or against internalism. Or rather, it does not so constitute an argument on the 
presumption of metaepistemological realism, according to which there is simply a 
fact of the matter as to whether internalism or externalism is the correct theory of 
justification. In §4, I will leverage my diagnosis to offer an argument for 
externalism and against internalism, one that will be congenial to the realist. But 
it is worth saying that, for a certain sort of epistemologist, my diagnosis already 
takes us a long way towards such an argument. 
 On a pragmatist approach to metaepistemology (Greco forthcoming and 
Shafer 2014), the internalism/externalism debate is substantive to the extent that 
the two views have different practical cash values. On an ameliorative view of 
                                                   
39 A similar approach is taken by Fredric Jameson in his treatment of conspiracy theory, 
which he calls ‘the poor person’s cognitive mapping in the postmodern age…a degraded 
figure of the total logic of late capital, a desperate attempt to represent the latter’s system’ 
(1988b, 356.) Jameson’s point is that conspiracy theorising is at best a second-best attempt 
on the part of the poor to come to terms, epistemically speaking, with an oppressive 
capitalist system: a ‘degraded’ and ‘desperate’ figure of their reality, but a representational 
one nonetheless. Conspiracy is neither an ideal form of representation – Jameson says it is 
‘marked by its slippage into sheer theme and content’ (ibid), variations on worn clichés 
that preclude genuine analysis – but nor is it a mere symptom of late capitalism. 
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epistemology (Haslanger 2000), the choice between internalist and externalist 
notions of justification should be guided by the question: which view would be most 
morally and/or politically useful? Both metaepistemological approaches would 
take the fact that externalism allows us to explain agents’ justificatory statuses in 
structural terms as potentially speaking in favour of externalism over internalism. 
For it is eminently plausible that the ability to count members of oppressed groups 
such as Charles and Nour as knowers, and oppressed people like  Radha as being 
robbed of justification by bad ideology, speaks practically in favour of externalism. 
The dispute between internalism and externalism will not only turn out to be 
substantive, but will moreover turn out to be a dispute between epistemologies of 
different political value.40   
 Before moving on, let me say, to those who are left unsatisfied by my 
diagnosis, that my overall challenge to internalism does not crucially hang on it. 
Even if I am wrong about why it is that our intuitions shift across the old and new 
cases, my cases still present a prima facie problem for internalism. For, insofar as 
the argument for internalism rests on the intuitive support it receives from cases 
such as CLAIRVOYANT, DOGMATIST and BRAIN-IN-A-VAT, the internalist must 
find something to say in response to my new, apparently analogous cases. The most 
obvious thing for an internalist to say is that my cases are not, despite appearances, 
analogous. How the internalist might argue for this claim is the topic of the next 
section. 
 
  
                                                   
40 My thanks to [omitted] for discussion of these issues. 
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3. In search of a disanalogy 
 
Perhaps my cases are relevantly disanalogous to the traditional ones, differing in 
a way that makes a difference for justification. If so, then the internalist could accept 
the verdicts that Radha is unjustified, and that Nour and Charles are justified, 
without having to abandon her internalism. My challenge would be thereby 
disarmed. 
 
3.1 RACIST DINNER TABLE and CLAIRVOYANT41 
 
Clairvoyant Norman isn’t justified, according to internalists, because there is 
nothing introspectively available to him that could plausibly serve as his grounds 
for believing the president is in New York. He does not have anything like a quasi-
perceptual vision of the president’s being in New York; at best he has, BonJour 
says, a ‘hunch’.42 But in Nour’s case, internalists might protest, there is something 
that serves as her introspectively available grounds: for Nour experiences her host 
being racist. Why is it not this experience that, for the internalist, justifies her 
belief? 
It is true that Nour experiences her host: she sees him, hears him, speaks 
with him. But does she experience her host being racist? As I have described the 
case, Nour does not have a conscious experience as of her host being racist: she 
enjoys no ‘my-host-is-racist’ phenomenology. Nevertheless, the internalist might 
press on, does Nour not experience the subtle behaviours – the verbal and physical 
cues – on which her subconscious racism-detecting mechanism picks up? Does she 
not thus have evidence that her host is racist, albeit evidence that she 
subconsciously rather than consciously processes? 
Certainly, there is a version of RACIST DINNER TABLE in which this is 
precisely what happens. But in the version of the case that I have described, Nour 
does not have conscious experience of those features of the host’s behaviour that 
trigger her subconscious racism-detecting mechanism. It is not that she hears a 
                                                   
41 I am indebted to an anonymous referee for pressing the following objection. 
42 Presumably the internalist does not think that mere hunches are sufficient to ground 
justification. If they were, then everyone who believed they were going to win the lottery 
would be justified in so believing. 
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certain inflection in the host’s voice, and sees certain fleeting micro-expressions, 
which in turn are processed by her subconscious, ultimately delivering the 
(consciously available) verdict that her host is racist. Rather, the detection of her 
host’s subtle behaviours – the ‘seeing’ and ‘hearing’ – is itself subconscious, or what 
psychologists call ‘preattentive’. Preattentive or subconscious processing of 
perceptual information, especially information related to environment threats43 
and emotions44, is a broadly recognised phenomenon, though not an 
uncontroversial one.45 Whether one could have the sort of subconscious 
processing of perceptual information that I ascribe to Nour’s is of course a further 
issue, one that I cannot possibly resolve. But even if it turns out that it is not 
possible for humans to subconsciously process subtle cues of racism, this just puts 
Nour in the same boat as Norman, who enjoys a power that no human actually 
has. 
Let me offer one further brief reply to this internalist line of defence. 
Suppose it really is a conscious experience – of vocal hesitations, flickerings of the 
eyes, etc. – that is then subconsciously processed by Nour, which in turn results in 
her belief that her host is racist. Now imagine Nour*, who has an internally 
identical experience to Nour, but whose host is just a bit socially awkward, and 
not at all racist. Is Nour*’s belief that her host is racist justified? My intuition here, 
for what it is worth, is that she is not. If this is right, then it means that even in 
this version of the case – where Nour does have some conscious experiences that 
could potentially serve as the grounds for belief – it is not these conscious 
experiences, but something else, that renders Nour’s belief justified. The 
externalist offers us an easy answer as to what that something else might be: 
namely, Nour’s reliable connection to the truth. 
 
3.2 CLASSIST COLLEGE and DOGMATIST 
 
Dogmatist Mary truly believes – based on her reliable colour perception, which 
she has reason to believe is unreliable – that the sculpture is red. Similarly, Charles 
truly believes – based on his reliable judgment, which he has reason to believe is 
                                                   
43 See e.g. Gray 1982 and 1995. 
44 See e.g. Balconi and Mazza 2009. 
45 See e.g. Block and Phillips 2016. 
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unreliable – that the college is classist. The internalist might protest that the cases 
are nonetheless disanalogous. For while Mary believes a proposition that is only 
contingently true (the sculpture is red), Charles believes a proposition that is true 
by necessity. For the college – holding fixed the non-normative facts about it – is 
classist in all metaphysically possible worlds.  
Why might this difference matter? Because one might think that beliefs in 
necessary truths are immune from defeat: that they cannot lose their justification 
through the acquisition of misleading first-order evidence (to the effect they are 
false) or through the acquisition of misleading higher-order evidence (to the effect 
that they are based on unreliable, unsafe or otherwise faulty mechanisms). Nagel, 
for examples, argues that beliefs in very simple logical and mathematical truths  
cannot be defeated by either first-order or higher-order evidence, because it is 
inconceivable that they are false (1996, 62ff). Because one cannot meaningfully 
entertain, Nagel says, the sceptical possibility that one’s judgment is false or based 
on an unreliable mechanism, defeat of such beliefs is impossible.46 But Nagel 
concedes that this isn’t the case with all necessary truths; in particular, he thinks 
that most ethical truths are such that we can conceive the possibility that our 
judgment about them is unreliable.47 Presumably, that the college is classist is one 
                                                   
46 Nagel’s argument glosses over an important distinction in how a belief might be 
unreliable or unsafe. On a standard safety account, S’s belief that p is justified just in case 
it is based on a method that does not produce a false belief that p in a sufficiently nearby 
world. A belief in a necessary truth trivially satisfies this test because there is no world – 
and a fortiori no sufficiently nearby world – in which S’s belief that p is false. But a refined 
safety account – one meant to apply to necessary as well as contingent truths – will say 
that S’s belief that p is justified just in case it is based on a method that does not produce a 
sufficiently nearby false belief. The refined account implies that S’s belief that p is unjustified 
if S believes not-p in a sufficiently nearby world. So even if Nagel is right that one cannot 
meaningfully entertain the proposition that 2 plus 2 doesn’t equal 5, so long as one can 
entertain the proposition that one could have easily believed that 2 plus 2 doesn’t equal 4, one’s 
belief could be still defeated by higher-order evidence. But I leave aside this complication 
in the following. I take it that, insofar as the Master’s testimony is (higher-order) defeating, 
it is because it constitutes evidence that Charles could easily falsely believe that the college 
is classist, not that he could easily falsely believe that the college is not classist. 
47 In such cases Nagel says we must weigh ‘the plausibility of the debunking explanation 
against the plausibility of the ethical reasoning at which it is aimed’ (ibid 115). Nagel’s 
formulation here is somewhat misleading, since one could have high credences in both an 
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such proposition: it does not enjoy the self-evidentiary quality of simple 
mathematical and logical propositions. So Nagel’s account of why certain beliefs 
in necessary truths enjoy immunity from defeat will not serve the internalist here. 
Nor will Plantinga’s insistence that what he calls ‘properly basic’ beliefs are 
immune from higher-order defeat, since Plantinga includes both perceptual beliefs 
and ethical beliefs in this category.48 Of course, one can simply insist that beliefs in 
all necessary truths – or just all necessary normative truths – are immune from 
defeat.49 This would be to draw a sharp disanalogy between CLASSIST COLLEGE 
and DOGMATIST, one that an internalist could leverage to explain why it is that, 
consistent with her internalism, Mary’s belief loses its justification but Charles’ 
belief remains justified. But absent a convincing explanation as to why Charles’ 
belief is so immune, this response is suspiciously ad hoc. 
 
3.3 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE and BRAIN-IN-A-VAT 
 
JaneBIV has an internal duplicate who knows that she has hands: normally 
embodied Jane. But Radha, it seems, does not have an internal duplicate who knows 
that she deserves to be beaten. Why might this disanalogy matter? It matters, the 
internalist might argue, because it suggests that – contrary to what I have claimed 
– Radha’s evidence does not in fact give internalistic support to her belief that she 
deserves to be beaten. If Radha’s evidence is not metaphysically compatible with a 
possible world in which she deserves to be beaten, how can it be that it supports 
her being in such a world? If this is right, the internalist has a ready explanation 
for why Radha is not justified: her belief is not (unlike with JaneBIV) supported by 
her evidence. 50  
                                                   
ethical proposition and the proposition that one’s ethical reasoning is unreliable. This 
would put one in a position of epistemic akrasia – a position that is not necessarily irrational. 
On epistemic akrasia see Coates (2012), Greco (2014), Horowitz (2014) and Sliwa and 
Horowitz (2015). 
48 Plantinga 1986, 311. 
49 One might, for example, insist that we should assign credence 1 to all necessary truths. 
But this feature of standard Bayesian accounting is a notoriously unrealistic, and thus 
unattractive, way of thinking about rational belief in necessary truths/falsehoods. 
50 I am indebted to [omitted] and an anonymous referee for raising this objection. 
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Let us grant for the sake of argument that there is no metaphysically 
possible world in which Radha, fixing her mental states, deserves to be beaten.51 
Why should this imply that Radha’s evidence cannot give internalistic support for 
the belief that she deserves to be beaten? Imagine an early modern scientist before 
the discovery of the chemical composition of water. Despite his assiduous 
laboratory procedures, a sample of his water gets accidentally contaminated with 
xyz; as a result, tests on this sample issue in results incompatible with the sample 
being (pure) H2O. Does the scientist thereby receive misleading evidence that 
water is not H2O? Surely the answer is yes. But there is no metaphysically possible 
world in which water is not H2O. So it would follow, from the principle that 
evidence cannot internalistically justify a metaphysically impossible proposition, 
that the scientist cannot get evidence that water is not H2O. 
 Something has gone awry. Our mistake was to think that relations of 
evidential support are constrained by metaphysical possibility. Bodies of evidence 
can be evidentially compatible with (and evidentially supportive of) propositions with 
which they are not metaphysically compatible. What matters for evidential 
compatibility is not metaphysical possibility but conceivability. It is conceivable that 
water is not H2O, even though water is necessarily H2O; thus it is possible to get 
misleading evidence that water is not H2O. Likewise, it is conceivable that Radha 
deserves to be beaten – indeed, Radha is just one of many who believes that 
disobedient wives deserve to be beaten – so it is possible for Radha to get 
misleading evidence to the effect that she deserves to be beaten. This is in spite of 
the fact that Radha has no metaphysically possible internal duplicate who knows 
she deserves to be beaten. 
An alternative way for the internalist to press a disanalogy between Radha 
and the brain-in-a-invat is to insist that Radha in fact is in a position to know that 
she doesn’t deserve to be beaten. For – a certain sort of internalist might say – all 
(minimally competent) humans are capable of knowing certain moral truths (e.g. 
that wife-beating is wrong) through a priori moral reflection. If Radha believes she 
deserves to be beaten, this just goes to show that she has not adequately reflected 
on the question. In this way Radha is importantly unlike the brain-in-a-vat, for 
whom no amount of assiduous reflection will reveal the truth that she doesn’t have 
hands. Such an internalist could agree with the externalist that Radha’s belief that 
                                                   
51 As an anonymous editor points out, epistemic internalism goes naturally hand-in-hand 
with an ethical view on which internal duplicates can’t differ in their moral properties. 
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she deserved to be beaten is unjustified, but for reasons quite different from those 
given by the externalist.52 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE would then be no threat to 
internalism. 
I will call this the ‘strong rationalist’ response. A strong rationalist does 
not merely insist that some moral truths are a priori knowable. A strong rationalist 
insists that certain moral truths are a priori knowable to every minimally competent 
agent. (Just because some very complex mathematical truth is a priori knowable 
doesn’t mean that it’s knowable for every competent agent.)53 Is such a view 
plausible?54 To be a strong rationalist is to effectively deny the possibility of 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE.55 For I stipulated that Radha thoroughly reflects on her 
situation and the moral issues at stake, and nonetheless – precisely because she has 
so thoroughly internalised the patriarchal ideology that surrounds her – is unable 
to see that she does not deserve to be beaten. The strong rationalist simply denies 
this possibility: he thinks that the truth that one does not deserve to be beaten by 
one’s husband is always yielded, to anyone, by proper a priori reflection, regardless 
of her epistemic situation.56  
                                                   
52 Thanks to both [omitted] and [omitted] for raising this objection. 
53 I’m grateful to [omitted] for this point. 
54 For a defence of strong moral rationalism, see Harman (2011, pp 460ff and m.s. p 22). 
Julia Markovits defends a strong form of moral rationalism in her (2014), though elsewhere 
she appears to hold back from endorsing the thesis that all minimally competent agents, 
regardless of their enculturation, can come to know the necessary ethical truths. In ‘Acting 
for the Right Reasons’ (2010), Markovits writes: ‘Agents can act from the motive of duty 
only if their moral reasoning is good…How good our moral reasoning is will depend on 
many factors that are beyond our control, including the quality of our moral education 
and…the culture in which we live’ (212). For defences of strong rationalism about the 
truths of rationality – what we might call ‘strong rationality rationalism’ – see Titelbaum 
(2015 and m.s., section 4) and Littlejohn (2018). 
55 Or to deny that Radha’s belief that she deserves to be beaten is false. See Titelbaum m.s., 
section 4, for a parallel dialectic. 
56 It’s uncontroversial that such a woman could come to know that she doesn’t deserve to 
be beaten by joining a feminist consciousness-raising group or reading some Catharine 
MacKinnon. But the rationalist must say something much stronger: that such a woman, 
without changing her epistemic situation – without gaining new experiences, new 
testimony, or new evidence – could come to know that she doesn’t deserve to be beaten. 
The rationalist might reply by drawing on a distinction between justifiers and enablers. 
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I for one find strong rationalism implausible. It seems to me plainly 
possible for there to be someone like Radha, who grasps the relevant concepts, 
reflects as thoroughly as she can, and still comes to the false belief that she 
deserves to be beaten. Indeed a case like DOMESTIC VIOLENCE seems to me quite 
pedestrian, and no less conceivable than, say, BRAIN-IN-A-VAT. (I don’t think there 
are any real-world brains-in-vats, but I do think there are quite a few real-world 
Radhas.)  Insisting on the impossibility of DOMESTIC VIOLENCE strikes me, then, 
as a large bullet for the internalist to bite. That said, for the internalist willing to 
do so, the threat represented by DOMESTIC VIOLENCE can be neutralised. Just 
how many internalists will find this an attractive option remains an open question. 
 
4. In search of an error theory 
 
The diagnosis I offered in §2 as to why our intuitions differ across the traditional 
and new sets of cases suggests a promising avenue for an internalist error theory 
of the intuitions elicited by my cases: political confounds. Specifically, the 
internalist might argue that our intuitions in the ‘bad ideology’ cases are unreliable 
precisely because they are cases about bad ideology. Perhaps it just feels too 
                                                   
While Radha has, in her current situation, all that is epistemically required for justifying 
the belief that she doesn’t deserve to be beaten (viz. her capacity for moral reason), she 
lacks the external conditions that would enable her to exercise that capacity. On this view, 
an activity like consciousness-raising would not directly change Radha’s epistemic 
situation, but would instead serve a role analogous to that served by pen and paper in 
completing a math problem. Does such a response help the internalist who wants to explain 
why Radha is unjustified? I’m not sure it does. Suppose Robert is trying to solve a  difficult 
math problem. He carefully and assiduously reasons his way through it, multiple times, 
and consistently gets an answer that appears to him to certainly follow, but which is in fact 
wrong. Robert is told by his math teacher and his peers that the answer is in fact right. 
Further suppose that Robert would (unbeknownst to him) have got the right answer had 
he been able to use pen and paper, which weren’t available. Is Robert’s belief in the wrong 
answer internalistically justified? I strongly suspect that the internalist will want to say it 
is. If so, the absence of enablers – pen and paper, consciousness-raising -- doesn’t suffice to 
render false beliefs internalistically unjustified. So this sort of strong rationalism won’t 
help the internalist explain DOMESTIC VIOLENCE. Thanks to [omitted] for prompting me 
to address this point. 
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politically unsavoury to say that a woman can justifiably believe that she deserves 
to be beaten, or that victims of racism or classism can be unjustified in believing 
themselves to be such victims. For political reasons we want to resist the internalist 
verdicts, and side with the externalist. But this is to allow – the objection goes – 
our political judgments to contaminate our epistemological ones. 
 But it’s not at all clear that we can do our epistemological theorising free 
of ethical or political confounds. After all, it is precisely the thought that it would 
be unfair to withhold justification from the brain-in-a-vat, or unfair to confer 
justification on Norman the clairvoyant, that motivates many to endorse 
internalism. Indeed Jennifer Nagel et al found that people’s willingness to attribute 
justification to protagonists in sceptical cases correlated positively with measures 
of empathy.57 Of course, two wrongs don’t make a right. Just because the internalist 
might depend on ethical confounds for her case doesn’t mean the externalist should 
follow suit.58 So let us consider a case in which the protagonist truly believes 
something that those who share my leftist political sensibilities would think false:59 
 
ABORTION: Thomas is a young man who has grown up in a community 
gripped by bad leftist ideology. All his life he has been surrounded by pro-
choice peers and adults, and exposed only to pro-choice arguments. But 
Thomas cannot shake the conviction that abortion is, despite what everyone 
says, wrong. His elders and peers tell him that this must be a manifestation 
                                                   
57 Nagel et al 2013s 
58 Thanks to [omitted] for pushing me on this point. 
59 Since moral truths are presumably necessary truths, if (as I think) abortion is morally 
permissible, then it is necessarily the case that abortion is morally permissible. Thus to 
entertain a case in which abortion is morally impermissible, as in ABORTION below, is to 
imagine a counter-possible case. I take it that such a world is at least conceivable. 
Alternatively, one could refashion the case to involve a contingent but nonetheless 
politically-loaded belief, e.g. about anthropogenic climate change. Thus one could imagine 
a world (non-actual but certainly possible) in which anthropogenic climate change was 
nothing but a liberal conspiracy, and in which a protagonist – through careful first-hand 
evaluation of the evidence and in the face of overwhelming testimony and gaslighting – 
formed a reliable true belief that anthropogenic climate change was a myth. For my part I 
have the intuition that such a belief would be justified, though I am certain of the reality 
of anthropogenic climate change. 
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of his deep-seated hatred of women. But in fact it’s the result of his genuine 
sensitivity to the moral truth, namely the truth that abortion really is 
categorically wrong. Despite all the misleading evidence from his peers and 
elders, Thomas cleaves to his belief that abortion is wrong. 
 
Is Thomas’ belief that abortion is wrong justified? I think the answer is surely yes. 
If abortion really were wrong, and it really were just a matter of bad ideology that 
made leftists think otherwise, then an individual who was genuinely sensitive to 
the badness of abortion, and formed a belief in its badness on such a basis, would – 
analogously with Charles in CLASSIST COLLEGE – be justified. And yet the 
confound error theory would predict that my intuitions wouldn’t go this way, 
because saying that a young man would be justified in his belief that abortion is 
wrong grates against my political sensibilities. (It does grate. But I feel the intuition 
powerfully nonetheless.) ABORTION suggests that what is doing the work in the 
bad ideology cases isn’t leftist political sympathies – after all, there is nothing in 
the notion of bad ideology that is inherently leftist – but the politically-neutral fact 
that these cases involve subjects forming beliefs under bad ideological conditions.  
 A different way of pressing the worry about moral/political confounds is 
to argue that my cases invite a conflation of epistemic justification with moral 
justification. On this diagnosis, the reason we intuitively want to withhold 
justification from Radha is because we are wary of endorsing the claim that she 
would be justified in acting on the belief that she deserves to be beaten. Likewise, 
we are intuitively inclined to say that Nour and Charles are epistemically justified 
because we would want to say that their acting on their beliefs would be justified. 
But this, the internalist might argue, is to conflate epistemic and practical 
justification: Radha’s belief is justified even if she wouldn’t be justified in acting on 
it, and Nour and Charles would be justified in acting on their epistemically 
unjustified beliefs.  Insofar as these internalistic verdicts are counterintuitive, it’s 
because we are conflating two distinct kinds of justification. 
 This takes us to a deep question that I cannot hope to resolve here, namely 
the relationship between epistemic and practical normativity. In a recent back-and-
forth on the a priori, Paul Boghossian and Timothy Williamson come up against 
just this issue.60 Williamson asks us to imagine a perfectly coherent Nazi. Is he 
                                                   
60 Boghossian and Williamson (forthcoming). 
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justified, Williamson wants to know, in believing that homosexuals should be 
killed? Boghossian, an internalist, assimilates the Nazi to the brain-in-a-vat, and 
concludes that the Nazi is ‘fully justified’, though of course massively in error, and 
says that he endorses this seemingly counterintuitive conclusion ‘wholeheartedly’ 
(ibid). Williamson concedes that one might worry that ‘there is something cheap 
about using the Nazi’ as a counterexample to internalism, since the ‘toxic nature of 
Nazism might prompt a moralizing attitude in which we automatically reject any 
positive description of the Nazi’s beliefs whatsoever’. But this, he goes on, is to miss 
the crucial connection between justified belief and justified action. If the Nazi is 
fully justified in believing that he should kill homosexuals, then why – Williamson 
asks – isn’t he morally justified in killing them?61,62 
Williamson, in other words, endorses a tight connection between practical 
and epistemic justification, which in turn makes reflection on morally and 
politically charged cases particularly useful for thinking about epistemic 
justification. On a different view, however, epistemic justification does not enjoy a 
close connection with moral justification. This is the sort of view that an internalist 
like Boghossian, who wants to insist that the Nazi is epistemically but not morally 
justified, should endorse. (Williamson, for his part, says that this sort of view ‘raises 
a question about the interest of justification in the epistemological sense, once it is 
severed from justification in the more general normative sense’.) As I said above, I 
do not hope to resolve this thorny issue here. But I do hope to have shown how the 
objection to the politically charged nature of my cases presupposes a not 
uncontroversial view about the relationship of epistemic to practical normativity. 
 Moreover, there is something to be said for the thought that the political 
nature of my cases underscores rather than impugns the trustworthiness of our 
intuitions about them. For my cases are far less recherché than their traditional 
analogues. Subjects operating under conditions of misogyny, racism and classism 
are a commonplace (or so I think) in the actual world, while brains-in-vats, 
clairvoyants and epistemology-hoaxing artists are presumably more modally 
                                                   
61 Like Williamson, I endorse an externalism on which epistemic justification entails truth. 
Otherwise, there could be cases in which one justifiably believed a false moral truth, and 
so (assuming a Williamsonian connection between epistemic and practical normativity) 
would be justified in acting on a false moral claim. 
62 For a more detailed defence of the use of morally loaded cases in epistemology, see 
Williamson (forthcoming). 
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remote. This in turn suggests that if any intuitions should be thrown out as less 
reliable, it should be those we have in response to the traditional cases, rather than 
the new, bad ideology cases. The diagnosis I offered in §2, in other words, not only 
does not impugn the reliability of our intuitions about ‘bad ideology’ cases. It also 
casts doubt on the trustworthiness of our intuitions about the traditional, humdrum 
cases we know and love. The challenge to internalism stands. 
 
5. Extending the challenge: mental state internalism63 
 
Mental state internalists claim that justification supervenes on an agent’s mental 
states, whether those states are accessible to the agent or not. On this view, what 
we might call ‘total internal duplicates’ – that is, two subjects who are identical in 
all their non-factive mental states – cannot differ in justification. A counterexample 
to mental state internalism is thus a case in which a subject is justified, but has a 
total internal duplicate that is not justified. 
 Are RACIST DINNER TABLE, CLASSIST COLLEGE and DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE counterexamples to mental state internalism? The question is 
straightforward with regard to CLASSIST COLLEGE and DOMESTIC VIOLENCE. If 
these are counterexamples to access internalism, as I have argued they are, they 
are also counterexamples to mental state internalism. For neither Charles nor 
Radha has a non-accessible mental state that would explain why they would differ 
in justification from a duplicate who shares their accessible mental states. 
Intuitively, Charles is justified, even while he has a total internal duplicate who is 
unjustified; and Radha is unjustified, even while she has a total internal duplicate 
who is justified. So these are potential counterexamples to not just access 
internalism, but internalism simpliciter. 
 RACIST DINNER TABLE is a slightly more vexed issue. For Nour does have 
a set of non-accessible mental states: namely, the preconscious awareness of her 
host’s behaviour. Does Nour have a total internal duplicate whose belief that her 
host is racist is unjustified? Imagine Sarah, who shares all of Nour’s subconscious 
mental states: she subconsciously ‘sees’ and ‘hears’ subtle facial and verbal 
behaviours in her host. Except that Sarah’s subconscious is not picking up on 
                                                   
63 With thanks to an anonymous referee and [omitted] for prompting me to consider such 
an extension. 
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actual facial and verbal behaviours, but fabricating them: she is subject to a kind 
of subconscious hallucination, through no fault of her own. (One might object that 
this surely means that Nour and Sarah have different subconscious mental states; 
but recall that mental state internalists think that internal duplicates must share 
only non-factive mental states.) Is Sarah’s belief that the host is racist justified? I 
think the answer is, quite plausibly, not. If so, then Nour does have a total internal 
duplicate who differs in justification – meaning that RACIST DINNER TABLE is a 
counterexample to mental state as well as access internalism. My challenge thus 
generalises to internalism simpliciter. 
 
6. Conclusion: externalism as a normative epistemology 
 
It’s often said that externalism is not a ‘normative’ epistemology. This is said by 
both internalists and externalists. Internalists mean it as a criticism: any 
epistemology worth having must be a normative epistemology, so externalism isn’t 
worth having. Externalists mean it as an explanation: they simply aren’t in the 
game of normative theorising, which is why their theory implies that blameless 
people (like JaneBIV) can be unjustified and irresponsible people (like Norman and 
Mary) can be justified. That externalism is not a ‘normative’ theory is also taken to 
explain why externalist theories are not ‘action-guiding’, in the sense of being 
operationalizable by agents under conditions of uncertainty or ignorance. By 
contrast, an internalist epistemology, which articulates its justification-norms in 
terms of the subject’s own perspective, can always be used to guide one’s own 
epistemic actions, and neatly tracks whether the subject is blameworthy or 
blameless.64 Internalism treats believers as normative agents, we say, while 
externalism treats them like mere thermometers.65 
 All this assumes that what it is to be a normative theory is to talk in terms 
that are familiar to us from ethics: blameworthiness and blamelessness, 
responsibility, action-guidance. But we might think this an overly restrictive 
notion of a normative theory (in ethics as well as epistemology). Marxism, for 
example, is arguably a normative theory, in the sense that it is responsive to the 
gap between how things are and how things should be. But Marx was uninterested 
                                                   
64 Though see [omitted] for an argument that no theory can satisfy this demand. 
65 A metaphor that originates with Armstrong (1973). 
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in the questions of what any given individual ought to do or who is to be blamed – 
concerns that he dismissed as typically bourgeois. Aristotle meanwhile thought the 
question of whether something is a good version of its kind – whether a citizen is a 
good citizen, or whether a thermometer is a good thermometer – was the 
paradigmatic normative question. And yet Aristotle thought that being a good 
version of one’s kind is not something that lies solely within the will of that thing. 
Virtue requires being embedded in a cooperative world. For Aristotle this 
dependency of the normative goods on ‘external’ facts appears to be a natural 
consequence of humans’ social existence: the things most worth having are those 
we can only have through our relationships with others. So too, the externalist 
thinks, with epistemic goods: the epistemic goods really worth having are those 
that cannot be had by mere individual effort. It is in this sense that externalism is, 
or can be, a normative epistemology. 
 One way of reading this paper is as I’ve presented it – as a straightforward 
argument against epistemic internalism and, ipso facto, for externalism. On this 
reading, my cases present a challenge to the internalist, one that demands that she 
say something about why these cases do not threaten her view of things. I would 
be happy to hear from internalists how this challenge might be met. But I would 
be just as happy – happier even – to have this paper read as an explanation of why, 
for at least some of us, externalism is attractive as a genuinely normative theory of 
justification and knowledge. Insofar as one thinks, as I do, that we live in a world 
suffused with bad ideology – insofar, we might say, that one’s view of the world is 
a radical one – an epistemology that is capable of operating in terms of structural 
notions becomes more attractive than one that can trade only in individualistic 
ones. One might be an externalist, in other words, not in spite of externalism’s 
detachment from the individualistic normative notions we hold dear, but precisely 
because of it. 
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